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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
FRANCES B. BUNZL, SUZANNE BUNZL
WILNER PATRICIA H. BUNZL and
ANNA R. WILNER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 2016cv270084

)

SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN,
LLP, BENNETT L. KIGHT, and ROBERT
B. SMITH,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Bennett L. Kight's ("Kight") Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the briefs submitted on
the Motion, the Court finds as follows:
It is well established that:

[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a
motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party
who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the
filing party's favor.
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73(2008) (quoting Anderson v. Flake,
267 Ga. 498, 501 (1997»; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6).

"[A] trial court may properly

consider exhibits attached to and incorporated in the pleadings in considering a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim for relief." Hendon Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275 Ga.
App. 434, 435 (2005). Defendant seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims against him because
(1) the doctrine of abatement requires a later filed action to be dismissed when the claims arise

-1-

out of the same transaction as claims in a previously filed suit with the same parties; (2) the
claims were not filed within the applicable statute of limitation; and (3) Plaintiffs did not
adequately allege Kight was acting in his capacity as Plaintiffs' attorney when authorizing the
transactions that constitute malpractice.
A. Doctrine of Abatement

O.C.G.A. § 9-2-5(a) provides in relevant part: "No plaintiffmay prosecute two actions in
the courts at the same time for the same cause of action and against the same party. . .. If two
such actions are commenced at differenttimes, the pendency of the former shall be a good
defense to the latter." Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-44(a) provides:
A former recovery or the pendency of a former action for the same cause of action
between the same parties in the same or any other court having jurisdiction shall be a
good cause of abatement. However, if the first action is so defective that no recovery can
possibly be had, the pendency of a former action shall not abate the latter.
These statutes "are closely related in effect and are to be considered and applied together." Huff
v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1995); see also Sadi Holdings, LLC v. Lib Props., Ltd., 293
Ga. App. 23, 24 (2008). "The general rule under O.CG.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and 9-2-44(a) is that
when there are two lawsuits involving the same cause of action and the same parties that were
filed at different times but that both remain pending in Georgia courts, the later-filed suit must be
dismissed." Sadi Holdings,293 Ga. App. at 24; see Jones v. Rich's, Inc., 81 Ga. App. 841, 845
(1950). In order for this Code section to be applicable, the parties must occupy the same status
in both suits. Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 248 Ga. 91, 92 (1981); Tinsley v. Beeler, 134 Ga. App.
514, 516 (1975). "Whenever a pending suit for the same cause of action has been pled,
abatement is required as a matter oflaw." Intl. Telecommunications Exchange Corp. v. Mel
Telecommunications Corp., 214 Ga. App. 416, 417 (1994). "A plea in abatement is one which,
without disputing the justice of the plaintiffs claim, objects to the place, mode, or time of
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asserting it." Hose v. Jason Prop. Mgmt. Co. of Atlanta, 178 Ga. App. 661, 662 (1986) (citations

omitted). "It is interposed to stop the plaintiff's action, leaving it open to the plaintiff, however,
to renew the suit in another place or form, or at another time. It should not assume to answer the
action upon its merits, or deny the existence of the particular cause of action upon which the
plaintiff relies." Id.; see also Sadi Holdings, LLC, 293 Ga. App. at 26-27 (noting dismissal of
renewal action was dismissal without prejudice).
On February 8, 2013, Kight and Lankford filed an action in the Superior Court of Fulton
County, Bunzl, et al. v. Kight, et al., CAFN 20 13cv227097 ("Bunzl 2013 Action"), seeking the
court's approval of their accounting of the Bunzl Trusts. In response, the defendants (Plaintiffs
in this action) filed a Third Party Complaint alleging fifteen counts against Kight and Lankford,
both individually and as Trustees of the Trusts, which included claims for breach of trust, breach
of fiduciary duties, accounting, theft, fraud, conspiracy, professional malpractice and negligence,
among others.
Lankford resigned as Trustee on May 11,2015, and Kight was removed as Trustee by
Order dated May 21, 2015.

The new general trustees, Patricia, Suzanne and Anna filed a Motion

to Amend Complaint to realign the parties, to add additional counts, and to add additional
Defendants. The Court granted this Motion by Order dated December 16, 2015. Now, Frances
Bunzl, Suzanne Bunzl Wilner, Anna Wilner, and Patricia Bunzl are Plaintiffs in the Bunz12013
Action and Bennett Kight, William Lankford, Judith Kight, Robert Kight, and several Playmore
entities are Defendants. Plaintiffs then filed their First Amended and Recast Verified Complaint
on December 28, 2015, which brought numerous claims against the named Defendants. Notably,
Count VII, which was brought against Kight for breach of fiduciary duty, alleges that as the
Plaintiffs' attorney, Kight violated his duty ofloyalty and other fiduciary duties by engaging in
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acts of bad faith, self-dealing, theft, conversion, fraud and concealment while managing the
Bunzl Trusts. (First Amended Compl., ~~ 769, 772). The Bunzl 2013 Action is currently
pending.
In the present case, Plaintiffs brought four claims against Defendants, both individually
and collectively, which included claims for legal malpractice, accounting, attorneys' fees and
punitive damages. Plaintiffs argue these claims are derived from Kight's status as a partner,
counsel, employee and/or agent of Defendant Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP

("Sutherland"). Most notably, the claim against Kight individually for legal malpractice is
prefaced on the claim that he "fail[ed] to exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence" in his
capacity as an employee/agent of Defendant Sutherland responsible for managing the Bunzl
Trusts. (Verified Compl, ~ 356). Plaintiffs set forth specific acts or omissions which they allege
constitute legal malpractice on behalf of Kight, which include: (1) failing to disclose Kight's
conflict of interest in representing the family and various trusts; (2) failing to disclose Kight's
illegal conduct through which he transferred money and assets to himself that belonged to the
Bunzl Trusts; and (3) Kight's making business decisions and stealing Bunzl assets, among
others. (Verified Compl. ~354).
Plaintiffs argue the doctrine of abatement does not apply because Kight does not have the
same status in both suits. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim in this suit Kight is being sued as an agent
of Sutherland while in the Bunzl2013Action Kight is being sued in his capacity as Trustee of the
Bunzl Trusts. Since the Bunz12013 Action does not have claims against Kight in his capacity as
an employee of Sutherland, Plaintiffs claim the doctrine of abatement cannot apply. However,
this argument is misguided. Instead, when determining whether the doctrine of abatement
applies, Georgia courts have considered whether the separate suit that was pending when the
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present claim was filed involved the same parties, alleged liability on similar theories, and arose
out of the same transaction at issue in the present claim. See Odion v. Varon, 312 Ga. App. 242,

244-45 (2011). When determining the status of each party, courts will typically look to whether
the plaintiffs in the previous action are plaintiffs or defendants in the present action, and vice
versa. See Tinsley, 134 Ga. App. at 516.
In both the Bunzl 2013 Action and this case, there are claims against Kight in his
capacity as an attorney responsible for managing the Bunzl Trusts; it is clear the claims arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence between the same parties. Plaintiffs in the Bunzl 2013
Action allege Kight breached his fiduciary duties by engaging in acts of self-dealing, bad faith,
theft, fraud and concealment through his various acts or omissions in managing the Bunzl Trusts.
In the present case, Plaintiffs allege Kight committed legal malpractice by failing to exercise
ordinary care, skill and diligence in his capacity as an attorney managing the Bunzl Trusts. To
establish legal malpractice, Plaintiffs point to the fact Kight engaged in self-dealing and theft by
causing money and assets of the Bunzl Trusts to be transferred to him, along with the fact he
failed to obtain written consent to engage in certain transactions where a conflict of interest
existed. The breach of fiduciary duty claim against Kight in the Bunzl20l3 Action and the legal
malpractice claim against Kight in the present case thus arise out of the same transactions or
occurrences: Kight's alleged mismanagement of the Bunzl Trusts as an attorney. See Griffin v.
Fowler et al., 260 Ga. App. 443,446 (2003); McMann v. Mockler, 233 Ga. App. 279, 281-282
(1998) (finding breach of fiduciary duty claim is mere duplication oflegal malpractice claim
because malpractice claim is based on establishment of a fiduciary, attorney-client relationship
that is breached). Any minor differences between the two complaints do not controvert the fact
they both assert claims against Kight that arise out of the same transactions and allege liability
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based on Kight's role as Plaintiffs' attorney. See Jones, 81 Ga. App. at 846. As such, the
doctrine of abatement would apply to the claims against Kight in the present case.
The argument that Kight does not have the same status in the Bunzl 2013 Action as he
does in this case due to being a counter-defendant in one and a defendant in another has been
rendered moot since the court realigned the parties in the prior filed case after the briefs in this
Motion were filed. Further, while additional defendants were added in this suit, the addition of
new defendants does not prevent the Court from dismissing the claims against Kight under the
theory of abatement. See McLain Bldg. Materials v. Hicks, 205 Ga. App. 767, 769 (1992).
Finally, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the Bunzl 2013 Action complaint is so
defective no recovery can possibly be had pursuant to it, as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-2-44(a) to
avoid abatement when the doctrine would otherwise apply. Because the claims in this action
against Kight arise out of the same transaction which the claims against Kight are based on in the
previously filed and still pending Bunzl 2013 Action, and because Plaintiffs failed to present
evidence that the Bunzl2013

Action complaint is so defective that recovery cannot possibly be

had pursuant to it, Kight's Motion to Dismiss the claims against him is GRANTED and the
claims against him are dismissed without prejudice.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 2016.

~IZ.~~
MELVIN K. WESTMORELAND,
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

Copies to: All registered users of eFileGA associated with this case.
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SENIOR JUDGE

-

,

-

Defendants

p'laintiJls

Attorneys for Bennett Kight:

Attorneys for Francs Bunzl, Anna Wilner,
Patricia Bunzl, and Suzanne Bunzl:

Barry J. Armstrong
Matthew M. Weiss
Shari L. Klevins
Mark A. Silver
Jeff Baxter
Dentons US LLP
303 Peachtree Street, Suite 5300
Atlanta, GA 30308
(404) 527-4000
barry.armstrong@dentons.com
matthew. weiss@dentons.com
shari .klevens@dentons.com
mark.sil ver@dentons.com
jeff.baxter@dentons.com

F. Edwin Hallman, J r.
Richard A. Wingate
HALLMAN & WINGATE LLC
166 Anderson Street, S.E.
Suite 210
Marietta, GA 30060
ehallman@hallmanwingate.com
rwingate@hallmanwingate.com
Anthony C. Lake
Craig A. Gillen
GILLEN WITHERS & LAKE, LLC
One Securities Center, Suite 1050
3490 Piedmont Road NE
Atlanta, GA 30305
aclake@gwllawfirm.com
cgillen@~llawfinn.com

Attornel!, tai: Sutherland Asbill & Brennanz
LLP and Robert B. Smith:
Daniel S. Reinhardt
Jaime L. Theriot
Alexandria J. Reyes
Nicholas H. Howell
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
(404)885-3000
Daniel.reinhardt(w,troutrnansanders. com
Jaime. theriot@troutmansanders.com
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